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ARTICLES
FAILED CONSTITUTIONAL METAPHORS: THE WALL
OF SEPARATION AND THE PENUMBRA
Louis J. Sirico, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
Metaphors are common devices in judicial opinions. Courts of-
ten find them useful in explaining the law and its application.
And in recent years, metaphors have sparked an increased inter-
est among legal scholars who are concerned with the metaphor's
role in advocacy and judicial opinion writing., Although courts
use metaphors to explain the law, they also use metaphors for a
more significant purpose: they use them to create the meaning of
the law. For example, when courts use the metaphor "the mar-
ketplace of ideas" with respect to the First Amendment's guaran-
tee of freedom of expression, we understand that freedom of ex-
pression was meant to take place in a forum resembling a laissez-
faire market.2 Further, in this environment the best arguments
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. I wish to thank my research
assistant at Villanova Law School, Kathryn Mellinger. Thanks also go to Professors Julie
Oseid and Chris Rideout for taking the time to review my manuscript.
1. See, e.g., HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS (Robert
K. Burdette ed., 1992); STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND
MIND (2001); Symposium, Using Metaphor in Legal Analysis and Communication, 58
MERCER L. REV. 835 (2007); see also Michael R. Smith, Levels of Metaphor in Persuasive
Legal Writing, 58 MERCER L. REV. 919, 945-47 (2007) (providing bibliography of recent
scholarship on metaphor); Michael R. Smith, Rhetoric Theory and Legal Writing: An Anno-
tated Bibliography, 3 J. AsS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 129, 135 (2006) (same).
2. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose
of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas . . . rather than
to countenance monopolization of that market. . . .").
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should win out. As Justice John Paul Stevens wrote, "But the
First Amendment does guarantee an open marketplace for
ideas-where divergent points of view can freely compete for the
attention of those in power and of those to whom the powerful
must account."3 Thus, because the constitutional amendment now
promises a marketplace of ideas, freedom of expression furthers
essential societal goals and enjoys considerable protection.
In the law of criminal procedure, the doctrine of the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" has played a significant role in defining the
constitutionally based exclusionary rule.4 According to the doc-
trine, evidence is inadmissible when it is obtained in an illegal
arrest, unreasonable search, or coercive interrogation.5 The initial
illegal evidence is the "poisonous tree" and the secondary evi-
dence is the "tainted fruit."6 The biblical roots of the metaphor in
the Gospel of St. Matthew7 and perhaps in the Book of Genesis'
3. Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 300 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The concept of the marketplace of ideas traces back to the dissent of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting), although Holmes did not use the term, but only the word, "market." The en-
tire metaphorical term first appeared in the concurring opinion of Justice William Bren-
nan in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
For detailed analyses of the metaphor, see Linda L. Berger, What Is the Sound of a Corpo-
ration Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the
Law, 2 J. Ass'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 169, 180-204 (2004); Steven L. Winter, Tran-
scendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1105, 1188-91 (1989).
4. See 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 20.07 (5th ed. 2010) (defining the doctrine); 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.3 (3d ed. 2007) (same). The doctrine made its first appearance in
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920), although the opinion
did not use the "poisonous tree" metaphor but did rest on Fourth Amendment grounds.
The metaphor itself first appeared in Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), which dealt with wiretapping that violated a federal sta-
tute. The metaphor later appeared in Justice Stewart's opinion in Lanza v. New York, 370
U.S. 139, 145 (1962), in which the Court stated that the defendant had not raised a "fruit
of the poisonous tree" argument with respect to evidence that had been obtained from an
intercepted conversation in a jail. The metaphor was first employed to forbid evidence on
constitutional grounds in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-87 (1963).
5. See LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 9.3(a).
6. See id.
7. Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree brin-
geth forth evil fruit. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a cor-
rupt tree bring forth good fruit. Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is
hewn down, and cast into the fire. Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know
them.
Matthew 7:17-20 (King James).
8. "And the LORD God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden
thou mayest freely eat: but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat
460 [Vol. 45:459
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undoubtedly add to its power and durability. The sensory and
health threatening connotations of a poisonous tree and its fruit
also compel a desire to exclude them from our criminal justice
system. Thus, the metaphor contributes to a broad definition of
the exclusionary rule.
Metaphors, however, have their drawbacks. They do not yield
precise legal tests. In the words of Judge Richard Posner, they
are "powerful though alogical modes of persuasion.", As Justice
Benjamin Cardozo wrote, "A metaphor, however, is, to say the
least, a shifting test whereby to measure degrees of guilt that
mean the difference between life and death.""o For example, the
metaphor of the marketplace does not indicate the extent to
which the marketplace-or free speech-can be regulated.", Not
only are metaphors prone to ambiguity, they also can define the
law so that it cannot grow to accommodate new situations in a
flexible manner.'2 Thus, some might argue that the marketplace
metaphor should not justify permitting corporations to make ex-
tensive contributions to federal election campaigns.'" As Justice
Cardozo also observed, "Metaphors in law are to be narrowly
watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end of-
ten by enslaving it."14
of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." Genesis 2:16-17 (King
James).
9. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 456 (1990). For a history
of how rhetorical theory has viewed metaphors, see J. Christopher Rideout, Penumbral
Thinking Revisited: Metaphor in Legal Argumentation, 7 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING
DIRECTORS 155, 159-71 (2010).
10. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES
100 (1931).
11. See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas: Commer-
cial Speech and the Problem that Won't Go Away, 41 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 181, 223 (2007)
("[The metaphor of the 'marketplace of ideas,' while illuminating some issues, is inade-
quate to the task of articulating appropriate boundaries for the regulation of commercial
speech, even on its own terms.").
12. See Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of' Law, 91 MICH. L. REV.
323, 331 & n.37, 388 (1992) (citing David A. Anderson, Metaphorical Scholarship, 79 CAL.
L. REV. 1205, 1214-15 (1991)).
13. The marketplace of ideas is not actually a place where items-or laws-are
meant to be bought and sold, and when we move from the realm of economics to
the realm of corporate electioneering, there may be "no reason to think the
market ordering is intrinsically good at all."
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. -, _, 130 S. Ct. 876, 977 (2010) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and
Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1386 (1994)).
14. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926); see MICHAEL R. SMITH,
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Because metaphors have inherent limitations, they can fail.
This article is about metaphors that have failed. More specifical-
ly, it examines through a historical lens two well-known meta-
phors that the Supreme Court of the United States has adopted
with questionable results. The first metaphor is the wall that al-
legedly separates church from state in service of the Constitu-
tion's Establishment Clause. The second is the penumbra ema-
nating from several amendments in the Bill of Rights that
safeguards the constitutional right to privacy. The first metaphor
defines the Establishment Clause in a debatable way that does
not always comport with the Court's decisions. The second justi-
fies the constitutional right of privacy with imagery that, I argue,
weakens its force and restrains its reach. The first metaphor
gives the reader a highly concrete image, while the second pro-
vides an image that is far more abstract. Yet they share similar
difficulties. The lesson from this examination is that we should
pay attention to the cautionary statements of Justice Cardozo
when adopting a metaphor and continuing to use it.
The subjects of these two metaphors present particular difficul-
ties. Some metaphors serve a purpose until courts devise more
precise (though not completely precise) tests. For example, al-
though the metaphor of the "dormant commerce clause" still en-
joys lip service in opinions, courts apply an articulated balancing
test, though one that leaves considerable room for diverse re-
sults." The two metaphors under discussion here, however, seem
ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING 207-11
(2d ed. 2008) (elaborating on Cardozo's point and illustrating how to challenge an unfa-
vorable doctrinal metaphor). But see Rideout, supra note 9, at 167 (explaining that a
statement of law interacting with a metaphor results in a concept with a new meaning,
not necessarily a negative consequence of the interaction) (citing I.A. RICHARDS, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC 93 (1964)).
15. The Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce. See U.S.
CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. According to the dormant commerce clause, state and local regula-
tions cannot unduly burden interstate commerce. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 5.3.1 (3d ed. 2006). Thus states cannot impose an invalid
burden even if Congress has not regulated in the area-that is, Congress has permitted its
commerce power to lie dormant. Id. For a general explanation of the doctrine and its his-
toric development, see id. § 5.3.
The current balancing test is:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly exces-
sive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is
found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
462 [Vol. 45:459
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not to lend themselves to workable alternative tests. And despite
their failings, they have demonstrated considerable staying pow-
er.
II. CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS AND THE JEFFERSONIAN WALL
Although the metaphor of a wall separating church and state
may be the most prominent metaphor in constitutional law, it has
not proven immune to criticism for the obstacle it has created in
finding a middle ground between strict separation and an ac-
commodation of the role of religion in American life. It is unders-
tandable then that the metaphor has enjoyed the allegiance of
separationists and encountered an unfavorable reception by ac-
commodationists. As the following chronicle demonstrates, the
Court has slowly moved away from the wall metaphor to a test
that turned out to be burdened by another troublesome meta-
phor-the entanglement metaphor. In recent cases, some Court
members have worked to reduced the influence of that metaphor
and, to some degree, focus on a less metaphorical test.
This section begins with a discussion of Jefferson's metaphor
and then chronicles its entrance into the Supreme Court's case
law. It then discusses the growing discontent with the metaphor,
the rise of the Lemon test and its controversial "entanglement"
prong, and the decline of the "wall" metaphor.
A. Jefferson's Metaphor
Although the metaphor of a "wall" separating church and state
harkens back at least to the sixteenth century Anabaptist leader
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)). The Second Circuit has articulated the test this
way:
A state statute or regulation may violate the dormant Commerce Clause only
if it (1) "clearly discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of intras-
tate commerce," (2) "imposes a burden on interstate commerce incommensu-
rate with the local benefits secured," or (3) "has the practical effect of 'extra-
territorial' control of commerce occurring entirely outside the boundaries of
the state in question."
Selevan v. New York Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Freedom
Holdings Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir. 2004)).
4632011]
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Menno Simons,16 its prominence in American jurisprudence stems
from Thomas Jefferson's familiar Letter to the Danbury Baptist
Association in 1802.17 The metaphor Jefferson used has since
played a significant role in giving meaning to the First Amend-
ment's Establishment Clause.,' The Baptists had written Jeffer-
son to congratulate him on his election to the presidency and to
express their concern as a minority religion in a state dominated
by Congregationalists, as their state did not recognize their reli-
gious freedoms as inalienable rights, but rather as "favors
granted."9 They hoped that Jefferson's influence would improve
their predicament and "like the radiant beams of the Sun,
[would] shine & prevail through all these States and all the world
till Hierarchy and tyranny be destroyed from the Earth."20 In his
reply, Jefferson wished his correspondents well and stated that
he concurred with their sentiments:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely be-
tween Man & his God, that he owes account to none other for his
faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach
actions only, & not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence
that act of the whole American people which declared that their leg-
islature should "make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of
separation between Church & State. adhering to this expression of
16. Daniel L. Dreisbach, The 'Wall of Separation" Motif in Biblical Literature and
Western Political and Legal Thought, 2 LIBERTY U. L. REv. 79, 88 & n.53 (2007); see id. at
85-93 (noting the use of the metaphor by religious leaders beginning with the Protestant
Reformation, who often supported their rhetorical argument with biblical references).
17. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, to Nehemiah Dodge
et al., Danbury Baptist Ass'n (Jan. 1, 1802), in DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON
AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE, app. 6, at 148 (2002). For
detailed histories of Jefferson's letter, see DREISBACH, supra, at 9-54; PHILIP
HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 144-89 (2002). For a historical and rhe-
torical analysis of Jefferson's metaphor, see Julie A. Oseid, The Power of Metaphor. Tho-
mas Jefferson's "Wall of Separation Between Church & State," 7 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING
DIRECTORS 123 (2010). For recent histories of the Establishment Clause, see HAMBURGER,
supra; JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL EXPERIMENT (3d ed. 2011).
18. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. For a comprehensive discussion
of the Supreme Court case law on the Establishment Clause, see 6 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 21.3
(4th ed. 2008).
19. Letter from Nehemiah Dodge et al., Danbury Baptist Ass'n, to Thomas Jefferson,
President of the United States (Oct. 7, 1801), in DREISBACH, supra note 17, app. 6, at 142-
43.
20. Id. at 143.
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the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I
shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments
which tend to restore to man all his natural rights, convinced he has
no natural right in opposition to his social duties.2 1
Jefferson never again used the metaphor in this context and
may not have meant it to express his definitive view on church-
state relations.22 Yet, for future generations, the metaphor has
lent itself to at least four interpretations.2 3 The wall could "pro-
tect the church from the state."2 4 It could "protect the state from
the church."25 It could prevent the federal government from inter-
fering with state authority over church matters,26 and it could
prevent the state establishment of churches. 27
First, the wall could serve as a barrier to protect churches from
intrusions by the state, in Jefferson's words, to prevent "inter-
meddling with religious institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or
exercises.... Every religious society has a right to determine for
itself the times for these exercises, and the objects proper for
them, according to their own peculiar tenets . . . ."28
Second, the wall could protect the citizen and the state from
the church. Thus, in Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists, he
asserted that "religion is a matter which lies solely between Man
& his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
21. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, to Nehemiah Dodge
et al., Danbury Baptist Ass'n (Jan. 1, 1802), in DREISBACH, supra note 17, app. 6, at 148.
For copies of Jefferson's preliminary drafts and their histories, see id. at 34-49.
22. Id. at 54.
23. I derive my analysis from the analysis in John Witte, Jr., Facts and Fictions
About the History of Separation of Church and State, 48 J. CHURCH & STATE 15, 28-33
(2006) [hereinafter Witte, Facts and Fictions] (discussing five understandings of the sepa-
ration of church and state); John Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of Separation, 101
MICH. L. REV. 1869, 1889-91 (2003) [hereinafter Witte, That Serpentine Wall] (discussing
five varieties of separationism).
24. Witte, Facts and Fictions, supra note 23, at 28; Witte, That Serpentine Wall, supra
note 23, at 1889.
25. Witte, Facts and Fictions, supra note 23, at 30; Witte, That Serpentine Wall, supra
note 23, at 1890.
26. Witte, Facts and Fictions, supra note 23, at 32; Witte, That Serpentine Wall, supra
note 23, at 1890.
27. Witte, Facts and Fictions, supra note 23, at 33; Witte, That Serpentine Wall, supra
note 23, at 1891.
28. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, to Reverend Sa-
muel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in DREISBACH, supra note 17, app. 9, at 153-54.
2011] 465
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worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions
only, & not opinions.""9
Third, the wall could separate the jurisdiction of the federal
government from that of the state governments. As Jefferson
stated in his 1805 Second Inaugural address:
In matters of religion, I have considered that its free exercise is
placed by the constitution independent of the powers of the general
[i.e., federal] government. I have therefore undertaken, on no occa-
sion, to prescribe the religious exercises suited to it; but have left
them, as the constitution found them, under the direction and discip-
line of State or Church authorities acknowledged by the several reli-
gious societies.ao
Fourth, the wall could prevent churches from obliging citizens
from having to support churches and participate in church activi-
ties, for example, by paying tithes, swearing oaths, and attending
religious services, all of which were common occurrences in early
America.31 Thus, the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, drafted
by Jefferson, declared:
That to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful
and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to support this or that
teacher of his own religious persuasion, is depriving him of the com-
fortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor
whose morals he would make his pattern, and whose powers he feels
most persuasive to righteousness . . .32
These very plausible meanings for Jefferson's wall metaphor
demonstrate its versatility in resolving societal issues and per-
haps helps explain its longevity as a staple in church-state dialo-
gue.
Even more central to its longevity is the nature of the meta-
phor. One need not subscribe to the tenets of cognitive linguistics
to recognize that a wall, which separates and containerizes, is a
fundamental conceptual construction employed by the human
29. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, to Nehemiah Dodge
et al., Danbury Baptist Ass'n (Jan. 1, 1802), in DREISBACH, supra note 17, app. 6, at 148.
30. DREISBACH, supra note 17, at 65 (citing Thomas Jefferson, President of the United
States, Second Inaugural Address of 1805).
31. Witte, Facts and Fictions, supra note 23, at 33; Witte, That Serpentine Wall, supra
note 23, at 1891.
32. REPORT OF THE COMM. OF REVISORS APPOINTED BY THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF VA. IN
MDCCLXXVI (1784), in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (Julian P. Boyd ed.,
1950).
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FAILED CONSTITUTIONAL METAPHORS
mind. People from all cultures and historical eras can visualize
a wall and understand its functions. Its fundamental nature
helps explain why the legal community would have great difficul-
ty in displacing it with an alternative conceptual model. Thus,
with respect to church-state relations, the rigidity of the meta-
phor-its inability to describe a wall that permits accommoda-
tion-contributes to the difficulty of modifying it to accept an in-
terplay of church and state.
B. The Metaphor Enters the Case Law
Jefferson's metaphor did not make an appearance in a Su-
preme Court judicial opinion until 1878 in Reynolds v. United
States." In that case, the Court held that the Constitution's Free
Exercise Clause protected religious beliefs absolutely, but did not
necessarily protect all religiously motivated conduct, including
polygamy.35 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Morrison Waite
related a history of governments allying with established reli-
gions to impose religious obligations on individuals and interfere
with their religious freedom, followed by a discussion of the pas-
sage of a bill in the Virginia House of Delegates that allowed for
religious freedom.36 As part of his discussion on the adoption of
the first constitutional amendment, Chief Justice Waite included
Jefferson's letter.37 He then stated that Jefferson's words defined
the meaning of the constitutional provision:
33. The germinal works on cognitive linguistics are GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK
JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980), and WINTER, supra note 1. For a recent collec-
tion of articles focusing on cognitive linguistics and the law, see Symposium, Using Meta-
phor in Legal Analysis and Communication, supra note 1, at 835. For a critique of cogni-
tive linguistics, see Michael Goldberg, Against Acting 'Humanely,' 58 MERCER L. REV. 899,
900 n.3 (2007).
34. 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). Jefferson's letter was not widely disseminated until 1853
when a collection of his works was published. HAMBURGER, supra note 17, at 259 (citing
Daniel L. Dreisbach, "Sowing Useful Truths and Principles'" The Danbury Baptists, Tho-
mas Jefferson, and the "Wall of Separation," 39 J. CHURCH & STATE 455, 491 (1997)). For a
detailed analysis of Reynolds in its historical context, see Donald L. Drakeman, Reynolds
v. United States: The Historical Construction of Constitutional Reality, 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 697 (2004).
35. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165-66.
36. Id. at 162-64.
37. Id. at 164.
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Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the advocates of
the measure, it may be accepted almost as an authoritative declara-
tion of the scope and effect of the amendment thus secured. Congress
was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left
free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or sub-
versive of good order."
Thus Waite offered no analysis of the wall metaphor, but dis-
cussed the letter's meaning as a whole. At best, he accepted the
metaphor as part of the argument that a wall prevented govern-
ment from intruding on religious beliefs.39
The wall metaphor did not again appear in Supreme Court
opinions until Everson v. Board of Education in which the Court
declared that the First Amendment's Establishment Clause was
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and therefore applicable to the states. 0 In that case,
Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, declared that the
Establishment Clause did not prevent a state from expending
public funds to transport children to religious schools.41 However,
he also recounted a history of religious oppression by government
and America's rejection of that oppression-very similar to the
history chronicled in Reynolds v. United States and the amicus
brief submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union in Ever-
son.42
As part of that history, Justice Black referred to Jefferson's let-
ter and the wall metaphor: "Neither a state nor the Federal Gov-
ernment can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and
State."'43
Justice Black saw the wall as protecting church from state and
state from church. To clarify his argument, he quoted from Wat-
son v. Jones, a nineteenth century case dealing with a church
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. 330 U.S. 1, 8, 18 (1947).
41. Id. at 18.
42. Compare id. at 8-14, with Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162-63, and Brief for ACLU as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 7-12, Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(No. 52).
43. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164).
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property dispute: "The structure of our government has, for the
preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions
from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured re-
ligious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority."44
Justice Black concluded his opinion on a strongly separatist
note: "The First Amendment has erected a wall between church
and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We
could not approve the slightest breach."45 This declaration set the
tone for future Court opinions.
In the ensuing years, the wall metaphor continued to make an
appearance, although on an irregular basis. Justice Black, writ-
ing for the majority in the 1948 decision Indiana ex rel. McCol-
lum v. Board of Education, reiterated the requirement of a wall.46
In that case, the Court invalidated a released time program in
which the school board permitted students to receive voluntary
religious instruction on school grounds.41 However, Justice Black
ascribed an additional, nurturing function to the wall of separa-
tion:
For the First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion
and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is
left free from the other within its respective sphere. Or, as we said in
the Everson case, the First Amendment has erected a wall between
Church and State which must be kept high and impregnable. 48
In his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson voiced his concern
with the ambiguous guidance that the Establishment Clause of-
fers courts."9 In emphasizing the danger that judicial decisions
may depend on the personal prepossessions of the judges, he
made reference to the wall that Jefferson had designed for the
University of Virginia: "And, more importantly, we are likely to
make the legal 'wall of separation between church and state' as
44. Id. at 15 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1871)). Watson v.
Jones was decided before the religion clauses were incorporated against the states. The
Supreme Court incorporated the First Amendment's protection of free exercise of religion
in 1940 in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Thus, the opinion did not rest on
constitutional grounds.
45. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
46. 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948) (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16).
47. Id. at 207, 209-10.
48. Id. at 212.
49. Id. at 237-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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winding as the famous serpentine wall designed by Mr. Jefferson
for the University he founded.""o
In 1952, in Zorach v. Clauson, the wall metaphor appeared in
the dissents of Justices Black5' and Jackson.52 The case permitted
public schools to release students to offsite locations for religious
instruction or devotion.51 In his dissent, Justice Jackson offered
an odd metaphorical concern about the Jeffersonian wall: "The
wall which the Court was professing to erect between Church and
State has become even more warped and twisted than I ex-
pected."54
After 1952, the metaphor fell into disuse until the early 1960s
when it reappeared in at least four cases.," Once again, it then fell
out of fashion until Justice Black revived it in his 1968 dissent to
Board of Education v. Allen, a case permitting New York to re-
quire local school boards to lend school texts to students in pri-
vate schools, including religiously affiliated ones. 6 Also, in 1968,
the metaphor received mention in Epperson v. Arkansas, a case
striking down a state statute forbidding the teaching of evolution
in public schools.'5
C. Questioning the Metaphor: The Lemon Test
By the 1970s, some of the Justices began questioning the value
and accuracy of the wall as a metaphor for the Establishment
Clause. In Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, Chief Justice
Burger wrote, "The course of constitutional neutrality in this area
cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat
the basic purpose of these provisions, which is to insure that no
religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none in-
hibited." 8 Burger thus replaced the "wall" with a "line," a boun-
50. Id. at 238; see DREISBACH, supra note 17, at 109.
51. See 343 U.S. 306, 317 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
52. See id. at 325 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 308-10, 315 (majority opinion).
54. Id. at 325 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
55. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) (invalidating school prayer); Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 493 (1961) (invalidating a religious test for holding public office);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 604 (1961) (plurality opinion) (upholding a Sunday clos-
ing law); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 443 (1961) (same).
56. 392 U.S. 236, 251 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
57. 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1998).
58. 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
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dary that could be shifted with greater ease. His conceptualiza-
tion stands in contrast to the absolute separatism of Justice
Frankfurter in McCollum: "Separation means separation, not
something less. Jefferson's metaphor in describing the relation
between Church and State speaks of a 'wall of separation,' not of
a fine line easily overstepped."6' In the 1980s, Burger again sof-
tened the strength of the metaphor by referring to it as "a useful
signpost"60 and as "a reminder that the Establishment Clause
forbids an established church or anything approaching it."61
In Gillette v. United States, a case dealing with conscientious
objection, Justice Marshall, in apparent agreement with Chief
Justice Burger, challenged excessive reliance on the Jeffersonian
metaphor.62 He wrote, "The metaphor of a 'wall' or impassable
barrier between Church and State, taken too literally, may mis-
lead constitutional analysis . ."63 He continued, however, to
state a test for Establishment Clause cases that relied on no me-
taphors: "[B]ut the Establishment Clause stands at least for the
proposition that when government activities touch on the reli-
gious sphere, they must be secular in purpose, evenhanded in op-
eration, and neutral in primary impact."64
The 1971 case of Lemon v. Kurtzman, dealing with state aid to
religiously affiliated schools, proved to be a turning point.65 Writ-
ing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger noted the limitations of
the wall as a metaphor: "Judicial caveats against entanglement
must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,'
is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship."66 He faulted the am-
biguous wording of the First Amendment's text:
59. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.).
60. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982).
61. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
62. 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971) (citations omitted).
63. Id. (citation omitted).
64. Id. (citing Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S 203, 222 (1963); id. at 231
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
65. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
66. Id. at 614. Chief Justice Burger also referred to the wording of the religion clauses
as "at best opaque." Id. at 612.
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Its authors did not simply prohibit the establishment of a state
church or a state religion, an area history shows they regarded as
very important and fraught with great dangers. Instead they com-
manded that there should be "no law respecting an establishment of
religion." A law may be one "respecting" the forbidden objective
while falling short of its total realization. A law "respecting" the pro-
scribed result, that is, the establishment of religion, is not always
easily identifiable as one violative of the Clause. A given law might
not establish a state religion but nevertheless be one "respecting"
that end in the sense of being a step that could lead to such estab-
lishment and hence offend the First Amendment. 67
Perhaps the ambiguity of the Constitution's wording promoted
the attraction of a metaphor that would give definition to the un-
derlying ill-defined concept. To better define the meaning of the
Establishment Clause, Chief Justice Burger metamorphosed the
blurred wall metaphor into the familiar three-part Lemon test:
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster
'an excessive government entanglement with religion."'68
The third part of the test, however, introduced a new meta-
phor: excessive entanglement. 69 Perhaps the reliance on that me-
taphor stems from the inherent imprecision of the word "respect-
ing" in the constitutional amendment-a word that troubled
Chief Justice Burger. Despite the leeway that the new metaphor
might have given for a more accommodationist view, subsequent
cases make clear that the Court has read this metaphor, and con-
sequently the Lemon test, as favoring the strict separationist in-
terpretation of the Establishment Clause at least into the 1980s,
after which the accommodationist interpretation sometimes pre-
vailed.70
In subsequent cases, the Court has typically employed the
Lemon test or some variant;' however, it has still discussed the
67. Id. at 612.
68. Id. at 612-13. Justice Burger found support for the second prong in Board of Edu-
cation v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968), and support for the third prong in Walz v. Tax
Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
69. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614-15.
70. See WIrE & NICHOLS, supra note 17, at 158-59 (stating that the '"accommoda-
tionist reading' of the Lemon test fell into desuetude" until Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983), another school aid case).
71. The primary variant or revision is Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). For a
discussion of the case, see infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
472 [Vol. 45:459
FAILED CONSTITUTIONAL METAPHORS
wall metaphor, although with decreasing frequency. For example,
in 1973, in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, a school aid case, Justice Powell's opinion for the Court
struck down a New York statute by applying the Lemon test. 72 He
acknowledged that "[i]t has never been thought either possible or
desirable to enforce a regime of total separation, and as a conse-
quence cases arising under these Clauses have presented some of
the most perplexing questions to come before this Court."73 Yet he
still offered some deference to the wall metaphor: "Neither, how-
ever, may it be said that Jefferson's metaphoric 'wall of separa-
tion' between Church and State has become 'as winding as the
famous serpentine wall' he designed for the University of Virgin-
ia.""7
In 1977, in Wolman v. Walter, another school aid case, Justice
Blackmun clashed with Justices Stevens and Marshall over the
meaning of the wall metaphor.75 Justice Blackmun quoted appro-
vingly Justice Burger's description of the wall in Lemon as being
"a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship."76 Justices Stevens7
and Marshal17 1 took a different view. In the words of Justice Ste-
vens, "What should be a 'high and impregnable' wall between
church and state, has been reduced to a 'blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier.' The result has been, as Clarence Darrow pre-
dicted, harm to 'both the public and the religion that [this aid]
would pretend to serve."'
In the 1980s, the most extensive and sharpest criticism of the
wall metaphor appeared in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace
v. Jaffree, a case rejecting a moment of silence in public schools:
72. 413 U.S. 756, 759, 773-83 (1973).
73. Id. at 760.
74. Id. at 761 (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238
(1948) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
75. 433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruled in part by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
76. Id. at 236 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
77. See id. at 266 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ('"Corrosive
precedents' have left us without firm principles on which to decide these cases." (quoting
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting))).
78. See id. at 257 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (declaring
that Court decisions had rendered the wall "incapable of performing its vital functions of
protecting both church and state").
79. Id. at 266 (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted).
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Whether due to its lack of historical support or its practical unwork-
ability, the Everson "wall" has proved all but useless as a guide to
sound constitutional adjudication....
... The "wall of separation between church and State" is a metaphor
based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a
guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned. 0
D. Decline of the Metaphor
Since 1990, in only five Supreme Court cases have Justices re-
ferenced the wall metaphor: three dissents by Justice Stevens,8 '
one dissent by Justice Souter,82 and one concurring opinion by
Justice Blackmun."' In each case, the respective Justice took a
separationist stance, asserting a violation of the Establishment
Clause.84 In each case, however, the metaphor exemplified the re-
spective Justice's position, but did not receive anything resem-
bling an extensive treatment."' Rather, the Justices each engaged
in a traditional legal argument that examined cases and tested
proposed rules for deciding the cases. 86
In several recent cases, the members of the Court have em-
ployed variations on the Lemon test that reduce the emphasis on
the entanglement metaphor. It cannot be said that a majority of
the Court has reached a consensus on exactly what the appropri-
80. 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 708, 709, 711, 730, 735 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 797, 814 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
82. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 873 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting
Everson, 330 U.S. at 16).
83. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 600-01 (1992) (Blackman, J., concurring)
(quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (1947)).
84. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 708, 735 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Zelman, 536 U.S. at
685-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 867-68 (Souter, J., dissenting); Pi-
nette, 515 U.S. at 797, 815 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lee, 505 U.S. at 599 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
85. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 708, 709, 711, 730, 735 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Zel-
man, 536 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 873 (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 16); Pinette, 515 U.S. at 797, 815 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); Lee, 505 U.S. at 600-01 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
86. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 707-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Zelman, 536 U.S. at
684-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 867-913 (Souter, J., dissenting); Pi-
nette, 515 U.S. at 797-815 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lee, 505 U.S. at 599-609 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
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ate test should be. However, the Court's ruling in Agostini v. Fel-
ton has proven the most enduring.17
In the 1985 decision Aguilar v. Felton, a school aid case, the
Court invalidated a federally funded program that permitted
public school teachers to provide remedial education, counseling,
and guidance counseling services in parochial schools.88 In a dis-
sent, Justice O'Connor expressed her strong reservations about
the entanglement prong: "If a statute lacks a purpose or effect of
advancing or endorsing religion, I would not invalidate it merely
because it requires some ongoing cooperation between church and
state or some state supervision to ensure that state funds do not
advance religion."89
Then, in 1997, in Agostini v. Felton, the Court reversed its de-
cision in Aguilar.9o Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor de-
veloped her argument in Aguilar and modified the Court's Lemon
test.9 1 Although she found that the government program satisfied
all three prongs, she described the entanglement prong "as an
aspect of the inquiry into the statute's effect" and arguably re-
duced that third prong as a hurdle for state aid programs.92
In 2000, Justice O'Connor's revision of the Lemon test in Mit-
chell v. Helms found extensive support.9 3 In upholding a govern-
ment program providing instructional equipment to parochial
schools, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy
joined Justice Thomas's opinion which read Agostini as recasting
the Lemon test's "entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion
relevant to determining a statute's effect." 94 In her concurring
opinion joined by Justice Breyer, Justice O'Connor agreed with
this understanding of the effects prong.95
87. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
88. See 473 U.S. 402, 406, 414 (1985), overruled byAgostini, 521 U.S. at 236.
89. See id. at 430 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Earlier, Justice O'Connor had suggested
some concern over the entanglement prong when she declared that it should be limited to
institutional entanglement. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
90. 521 U.S. at 208-09.
91. Id. at 232-35.
92. Id. at 233-35.
93. See 530 U.S. 793, 807-08 (2000).
94. Id. at 801, 808.
95. See id. at 845 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2011] 475
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, a case upholding a tuition
voucher plan, the Court confirmed the Agostini revision by consi-
dering only the purpose and effects prong of the Lemon test.96
Justice O'Connor, concurring, further confirmed the revision,
stating that Agostini "folded the entanglement inquiry into the
primary effect inquiry. This made sense because both inquiries
rely on the same evidence, and the degree of entanglement has
implications for whether a statute advances or inhibits religion."9 7
Yet, in his plurality opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, dealing with a
Ten Commandments monument on public grounds, Chief Justice
Rehnquist referenced entanglement as a separate prong of the
Lemon test."
In many recent decisions, the Justices have written joint and
separate opinions that disclose both their views on church-state
relationships and on the proper judicial test to apply. In some
cases, the Court decisions have turned on deciding whether the
contested government action was religiously neutral.99 Justices
have also used a "coercion test" to invalidate government action
that coerces anyone to participate in any religion or religious ex-
ercise.o10 Some Justices, particularly Justice O'Connor, have
asked whether the government action appeared to endorse cer-
tain religious beliefs.10o Still others would determine whether the
government action stemmed from the country's historic ways of
treating religious matters.0 2
A review of the case law discloses many sharply divided opi-
nions among the Justices and a resulting uncertainty about the
status of the law. However, from the viewpoint of rhetoric, the
use of the metaphor has declined. The early dominant use of the
96. See 536 U.S. 639, 648-49 (2002).
97. Id. at 668-69 (citations omitted).
98. 545 U.S. 677, 686 n.6 (2005) (plurality opinion) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)). However, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the Lemon test
was unhelpful in deciding this type of case. See id. at 686.
99. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102, 114 (2001) (cita-
tion omitted) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge and deciding the case on free
speech grounds).
100. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (citations omitted) (invalidat-
ing prayer at a high school graduation).
101. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (invalidating a courthouse posting of the Ten Commandments).
102. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686-92 (validating a Ten Commandments monument
on state grounds).
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wall metaphor reflected the heavily separationist leanings of the
Court.0 The shift to the Lemon test and its variants demonstrat-
ed a shift from reliance on general policy to reliance on a rule.
However, the inclusion of the entanglement metaphor as a prong
of the rule offered potential room for ambiguity. Yet, it proved an
opportunity for the separationist argument to continue to domi-
nate, though perhaps not to such a great degree as before. With
the decrease in emphasis on entanglement in recent cases, 104 the
reliance on metaphor is receding. 0' Nevertheless, although the
Court remains divided, the rhetorical tools do not so greatly favor
one set of advocates. ,
Despite the decline of the wall metaphor in Supreme Court
cases, it rears up in the opinions of the lower courts 06 and in a
plentiful number of law review articles.10 An electronic search of
a commercial database will disclose over one thousand law review
articles in the last ten years that reference the wall metaphor. 1o
Thus, despite its decline in the nation's highest court, it still
haunts.
III. PRIVACY IN THE PENUMBRA
A. The Metaphor Before Griswold
In legal circles, the metaphor of the penumbra is identified
with Justice William 0. Douglas's definition of privacy as a con-
stitutional right in Griswold v. Connecticut, the case that invali-
dated a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use and distribution
of contraceptives.'09 However, the judicial use of the metaphor
103. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997).
105. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 114 (2001) (citations
omitted) (basing its decision on whether the government action was religiously neutral);
Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (relying on a coercion test).
106. See, e.g., Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263, 1290 n.14 (11th Cir. 2008) (Mid-
diebrooks, J., dissenting); Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d 1, 15 (2d Cir. 2006) (cita-
tions omitted); Koenick v. Felton, 190 F.3d 259, 264 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted);
Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 383 (6th Cir. 1999).
107. See, e.g., Dreisbach, supra note 16; Oseid, supra note 17.
108. Search Query for "Wall of Separation," LEXISNEXIS, www.lexisnexis.com (select
"Search" hyperlink; then select "Secondary Legal" hyperlink; then select "Law Reviews,
CLE, Legal Journals & Periodicals, Combined" hyperlink; then search for "'Wall of Sepa-
ration' and date aft 10/1/2000"; then follow "Search" hyperlink).
109. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The literature on the case is extensive. See, e.g., A
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goes back to Justice Stephen Field's 1871 circuit court opinion in
Montgomery v. Bevans.n0 In that case, John Montgomery's father
had accepted a deed to property on his son's behalf.", However,
Montgomery, a captain in the United States Navy, had left the
area before the delivery to serve on a ship docked in San Francis-
co.H2 According to the prevailing law, a person was presumed
dead after not being heard from for seven years."' After seven
years, Montgomery's father claimed the property as his son's
heir." The father's claim could prove successful if the son had
died only after the deed had been delivered." Justice Field sum-
marized the argument:
[H]ence counsel argue that there is no presumption in favor of the
continuance of life during the penumbra, or death period, of seven
years, for if such presumption prevailed for one day after disappear-
ance proved, it would necessarily prevail for six years and three
hundred and sixty-four days, and the whole basis upon which the
presumption of death rests would become absurd.116
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES:
GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT (Roy M. Mersky & Jill Duffy eds., 2001); CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 15, § 10.3.2; DAVID J. GARROw, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND
THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 131-270 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1998) (1994); JOHN W.
JOHNSON, GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT- BIRTH CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO PRIVACY (2005); 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.7, at 810-12 (4th ed. 2007); Sym-
posium on the Griswold Case and the Right of Privacy, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197 (1965); Ste-
phen C. Veltri, Fowler V Harper and the Right of Privacy: Twenty-Five Years, 16 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 359 (1989).
110. 17 F. Cas. 628, 632 (C.C.D. Cal. 1871) (No. 9735). For histories of the metaphor's
use in Supreme Court decisions, see Henry T. Greely, A Footnote to "Penumbra" in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 251 (1989); Burr Henly, 'Penumbra" The Roots
of a Legal Metaphor, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81 (1987). I have relied heavily on these
articles for tracing the metaphor's judicial history. For an excellent rhetorical analysis, see
Rideout, supra note 9.
111. Montgomery, 17 F. Cas. at 629.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 632.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes had previously used the metaphor in a law re-
view article:
The growth of the law is very apt to take place in this way: Two widely differ-
ent cases suggest a general distinction, which is a clear one when stated
broadly. But as new cases cluster around opposite poles, and begin to ap-
proach each other, the distinction becomes more difficult to trace . . . and at
last a mathematical line is arrived at by the contact of contrary decisions,
which is so far arbitrary that it might equally well have been drawn a little
further to the one side or to the other. The distinction between the groups,
however, is philosophical, and it is better to have a line drawn somewhere in
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Field thus used "penumbra" to describe the period during
which the law might or might not determine that the missing in-
dividual was dead. His use of the word deviated from Johannes
Kepler's original astronomical definition: "a partially shaded re-
gion around the darker shadow of an opaque body.""7
The metaphor again appeared in judicial opinions, but not un-
til thirty years had passed, when Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
used it, first in three opinions of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court,"" and then in four opinions of the Supreme Court
of the United States."9 In three of the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States's opinions, Holmes employed "penumbra" to describe
situations in which it is difficult to engage in line drawing. 120
Thus in one case, a dissent, he wrote, "The great ordinances of
the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and
white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a
the penumbra between darkness and light, than to remain in uncertainty.
Note, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 654 (1873). In a later writing, he used the
metaphor to convey the same meaning. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
127 (Dover Publications 1991) (1881).
117. The Oxford English Dictionary traces the word to its origination in Kepler's AD
VITELLIONEM PARALIPOMENA (1604). See 11 Oxford English Dictionary 502 (2d ed. 1989).
The updated online version of the dictionary offers this primary definition:
The partially shaded region around the shadow of an opaque body, when the
light source is larger than a point source and only part of its light is cut off
(contrasted with the full shadow or umbra); . . . that of the shadow cast by
the moon on the earth in a solar eclipse, or by the earth on the moon in a lu-
nar eclipse, resulting in an area that experiences only a partial eclipse.
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/ (search for "penumbra"; then
follow "Find Word" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 3, 2010). The dictionary also offers a defi-
nition for an "extended use" in United States law: "Esp. in constitutional jurisprudence:
the scope of a legal provision, esp. the range of its application extending beyond the rights,
privileges, or immunities it enumerates explicitly." Id. (search for "extended use"; then
follow "Find Word" hyperlink).
118. See Driscoll v. Towle, 63 N.E. 922, 923 (Mass. 1902); Kerslake v. Cummings, 61
N.E. 760, 761 (Mass. 1901); Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 59 N.E. 1033, 1034 (Mass.
1901).
119. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting),
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Springer v. Gov't of the Phi-
lippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schlesinger v. Wiscon-
sin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf,
240 U.S. 403, 426 (1916) (Holmes, J., concurring), superseded by statute, Lanham Act,
Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.), as recognized in Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 299
(1985).
120. See Springer, 277 U.S. at 209; Schlesinger, 270 U.S. at 241; Hanover Star Milling
Co., 240 U.S. at 426.
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penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other."121 In
another dissent, he employed the metaphor in a manner similar
to Justice Douglas in Griswold in describing the extended reach
of a constitutional amendment.122 In declaring that federal courts
should not admit evidence obtained through wire-tapping, but re-
serving judgment on whether the Constitution mandated exclu-
sion, he wrote:
While I do not deny it, I am not prepared to say that the penumbra
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments covers the defendant, although
I fully agree that Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of a law where those words import a policy that goes beyond
them.123
Although other judges employed the "penumbra" metaphor,
Judge Learned Hand used it most frequently-eleven times-
usually to emphasize the ambiguity of words and concepts.'2 4 For
example, in his dissent in Commissioner v. Ickelheimer, concern-
ing a statutory tax provision, he wrote:
[T]he colloquial words of a statute have not the fixed and artificial
content of scientific symbols; they have a penumbra, a dim fringe, a
connotation, for they express an attitude of will, into which it is our
duty to penetrate and which we must enforce ungrudgingly when we
can ascertain it, regardless of imprecision in its expression. 12 '
At the Supreme Court, prior to 1941, Justice Benjamin Cardo-
zo employed the metaphor three times,126 and Justices Louis
Brandeis,127 Felix Frankfurter, 1 Harlan Stone,129 and Chief Jus-
121. Springer, 277 U.S. at 209.
122. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965), with Olmstead,
277 U.S. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
123. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
124. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494
(1951); Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1950),
affd, 341 U.S. 694 (1951); United States v. Rabinowitz, 176 F.2d 732, 735 (2d Cir. 1949),
rev'd, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United
States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir. 1945); Andrews v. Comm'r, 135 F.2d 314, 319
(2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J., dissenting); Comm'r v. Ickelheimer, 132 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir.
1943) (Hand, J., dissenting); Landers, Frary & Clark v. Universal Cooler Corp., 85 F.2d
46, 48 (2d Cir. 1936); Wachs v. Balsam, 38 F.2d 50, 51 (2d Cir. 1930); Van Vlaanderen v.
Peyet Silk Dyeing Corp., 278 F. 993, 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); The Poznan, 276 F. 418, 428
(S.D.N.Y. 1921); Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Bolton Chem. Corp., 219 F. 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y.
1915).
125. 132 F.2d at 662 (citing Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908)).
126. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring); Dayton Power &
Light v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 292 U.S. 290, 309 (1934).
127. See Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 451 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
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tice Charles Evans Hughes' each employed it once. After that
date and until the Griswold opinion,a'3 Justice Douglas employed
it eight times,," and Justices William Brennan,3 3 Robert Jack-
son, 134 Wiley Rutledge,13 ' and Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone36
each employed it once.
Yet, the various Justices gave the metaphor different meanings
in different cases. In some instances, they used "penumbra" to re-
fer to an area of indeterminacy in the law. For example, in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, Justice Cardozo wrote,
"There is no penumbra of uncertainty obscuring judgment here.
To find immediacy or directness here is to find it almost every-
where."117 In other instances, they gave the word a meaning that
bore some connection to its conventional meaning. For example,
in Coleman v. Miller, a group of Kansas state legislators chal-
lenged Kansas's ratification of a federal constitutional amend-
ment."' In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter argued that
the legislators lacked the individualized legal interest necessary
for standing. "9 Frankfurter observed, "No doubt the bounds of
such legal interest have a penumbra which gives some freedom in
judging fulfillment of our jurisdictional requirements."40
(quoting Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
128. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 465 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
129. See Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587, 607 (1934) (Stone, J.,
dissenting), superseded by statute, Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, §§ 7, 11, 64 Stat. 1125
(1950).
130. See Cont'l Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352, 370 (1932).
131. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965) (decided June 7, 1965).
132. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 39 (1964); Wilson v. Schnett-
ler, 365 U.S. 381, 392 n.5 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Panama Canal Co. v. Grace
Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 317 (1958), superseded by regulation, Acquiring of Commercial or
Industrial Products and Services Needed by the Government, Policy Revision, 44 Fed.
Reg. 20,556 (Apr. 5, 1979); Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 97 (1957); Textile Workers Un-
ion v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957); Gen. Box Co. v. United States, 351 U.S. 159,
169 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Gen. Comm. of Adjustment v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co.,
320 U.S. 323, 336 (1943); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 331-32 (1941) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
133. See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 99 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315 (1945) (citing Camfield v.
United States, 167 U.S. 518, 523-24 (1897)).
135. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 130 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
136. See Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 360 (1945).
137. 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
138. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
139. Id. at 464 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 465.
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Why these Justices gave deviant meanings to "penumbra" is a
puzzlement. Perhaps they did not know what the word meant.
The dictionary definitions are technical and not easy to under-
stand. 14 And perhaps they could think of no metaphors that accu-
rately conveyed the meaning that they wished to convey. Yet,
there are serviceable words available. For example, if a statute is
ambiguous, a court might state that the statute is ambiguous and
that the policy considerations dictate giving its meaning an ex-
pansive interpretation. But perhaps among wordsmiths, the love
for rhetoric is so powerful that the passion for metaphor triumphs
over more pedestrian phraseology.
Prior to Griswold, Justice Douglas employed the penumbra
metaphor in eight opinions and in each instance employed it to
mean "periphery" or "fringe."142 For example, in his dissent in
United States v. Classic, he concurred with the majority that the
Federal Constitution permitted Congress to regulate certain pri-
mary elections and nomination procedures of political parties.143
However, he declined to find that the United States Criminal
Code criminalized the conduct in question:
It is not enough for us to find in the vague penumbra of a statute
some offense about which Congress could have legislated, and then
to particularize it as a crime because it is highly offensive. Civil li-
berties are too dear to permit conviction for crimes which are only
implied and which can be spelled out only by adding inference to in-
ference. 144
B. Griswold and the Metaphor
In Griswold, Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court used the
penumbra metaphor to establish a constitutional right to privacy
that invalidated the Connecticut statute banning the use and dis-
tribution of contraceptives."' Because he did not want to ground
the right of privacy on a substantive due process akin to the out-
dated analysis of Lochner v. New York, Douglas needed to find a
141. See supra note 117 (providing the definition in the online version of the OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY).
142. See cases cited supra note 132.
143. 313 U.S. 299, 330 (1941).
144. Id. at 331-32 (citation omitted).
145. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480, 483-85 (1965) (discussing various cas-
es that suggest specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights, especially the First Amendment,
which recognize zones of privacy).
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basis elsewhere in the Constitution.1 46 However, because the Con-
stitution provided no firm textual basis for finding a right to pri-
vacy, Douglas found the right implicit in the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. 147 He wrote, "The foregoing cases
suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have pe-
numbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance."148 With respect to the First
Amendment, he stated, "In other words, the First Amendment
has a penumbra where privacy is protected from government in-
trusion.""'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg gave support to
Douglas's metaphor: "In reaching the conclusion that the right of
marital privacy is protected, as being within the protected pe-
numbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, the Court re-
fers to the Ninth Amendment. I add these words to emphasize
the relevance of that Amendment to the Court's holding."15 0
In his concurring opinion, Justice John Harlan also used the
metaphor to describe his disagreement with the majority's refusal
to find a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment: "[The] approach to this case [is] very much like that
taken by my Brothers Black and Stewart in dissent, namely: the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not touch
this Connecticut statute unless the enactment is found to violate
146. Id. at 481-82 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating state
legislation setting maximum hours for bakers as interfering with the workers' freedom of
contract and not furthering a valid police purpose)). By 1937, the Court had clearly re-
jected Lochner. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a sta-
tute mandating minimum wages for female employees); United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding a statute prohibiting the interstate shipping of
"filled milk"-a combination of skimmed milk and nonmilk fat). In Griswold, Justice
Douglas wrote:
Coming to the merits, we are met with a wide range of questions that impli-
cate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Overtones of
some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New York should be our guide. But
we decline that invitation . . . . We do not sit as a super-legislature to deter-
mine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems,
business affairs, or social conditions.
381 U.S. at 481-82 (citations omitted).
147. See 381 U.S. at 484.
148. Id. (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-22 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
149. Id. at 483.
150. Id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
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some right assured by the letter or penumbra of the Bill of
Rights."51
Thus following the precedent of many of their predecessors,
Douglas, Goldberg, and Harlan gave "penumbra" a meaning that
deviates from its dictionary definition.152 While "penumbra" is a
shadowy area created when one body partially obscures a source
of light,'5 3 the Justices used the word to analogize to light ema-
nating from a light source.'54 For them, the light sources are vari-
ous constitutional amendments, and the "light" that emanates
from them protects a right that flows from the "light."'55
This transformation of meaning is understandable. Finding a
right to privacy in the shadows lacks a persuasive rhetorical ring.
Bright auras are more attractive than shadows. Yet, establishing
a fundamental right only by locating it in the fringes of an aura is
bound to accentuate the weakness of the argument.
From the perspective of rhetorical analysis, Justice Douglas's
metaphor violates a "rule" that effective metaphors must be both
internally and externally coherent and thus correspond to our
conventional understanding of how the world works.'5 6 The meta-
phor lacks internal coherence, because placing a right in a pe-
numbra-given that the true source of light is the constitutional
amendment-is inconsistent with the definition of a penumbra as
a shaded area remote from a light source.'57 The metaphor lacks
external coherence because it locates the right of privacy in the
penumbra and thus contradicts the well-accepted metaphor that
"ideas are light sources."'5
Perhaps Justice Douglas would have improved his argument
by describing the amendments in the Bill of Rights as bright
stars in the constitutional firmament with the right of privacy at
151. Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
152. To be clear, Justice Harlan rejected the analysis of Justice Douglas and relied on a
substantive due process analysis. See id. at 500.
153. See supra note 117.
154. Cf. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (Douglas, J., delivering the opinion of the Court); id.
at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
155. Cf. id. at 484 (Douglas, J., delivering the opinion of the Court); id. at 487 (Gold-
berg, J., concurring); id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring).
156. See Rideout, supra note 9, at 187-88.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 187 (citing STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST 173 (2001);
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 33, at 48).
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their cores. To be sure, this metaphor, like the "penumbra" meta-
phor, deviates from the correct reading of the Bill of Rights as li-
miting government's power to interfere with individual rights. 15
Still, it conforms to our popular understanding of these constitu-
tional amendments as sources of rights, as opposed to constitu-
tional limitations on government.
This failure to find a firmer textual basis for the right explains
the reservations that some of the Justices and their clerks, not to
mention the later academic commentators, had about the Douglas
opinion. According to the recollections of the clerks, some clerks
and Justices were disappointed with Justice Douglas's analysis
and his failure to fully develop this "penumbra" argument. 160
However, efforts to persuade him to revise his opinion proved on-
ly partially successful. 161
One critic wrote: "In sum, the reasoning in Griswold is utterly
incomprehensible. It hints that a constitutional right may be dis-
covered outside the Constitution if its verbal formulation is a
'second cousin' of an express constitutional guarantee. By that
logic, virtually any claimed right is a plausible candidate for con-
stitutional recognition."16 2
The dilemma of lacking an express text for a new constitutional
right cannot be solved by creating a compelling metaphor. The di-
lemma is too profound to admit of such a comparatively easy so-
lution. Here, any argument is suspect when it looks to the peri-
phery of a constitutional right as the location for a fundamental
right. The right has to find its home in a more central textual lo-
cation. Perhaps Douglas might have reduced the criticism if he
had forgone any metaphor and declared that the right of privacy
was implicit in a particular constitutional provision, such as the
First Amendment or the Ninth Amendment. Although the argu-
ment may still be vulnerable to objection, it is a stronger argu-
ment.
159. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
160. See GARROW, supra note 109, at 245-49 (recounting the frustrations of both jus-
tices and clerks); JOHNSON, supra note 109, at 159-61 (same).
161. See, e.g., GARROW, supra note 109, at 245-51 (recounting these efforts and their
results); JOHNSON, supra note 109, at 157-65, 170 (same).
162. Bruce Fein, Griswold v. Connecticut: Wayward Decision-Making in the Supreme
Court, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 551, 554 (1989).
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No doubt the weakness of the metaphor may help explain why
the Supreme Court has employed it sparingly in subsequent cas-
es. According to an electronic data search, since the 1965 Gris-
wold case, the metaphor has appeared in only thirty-nine Su-
preme Court cases, 63 and of these, only eleven dealt with the
constitutional right of privacy.164 In most of the remaining cases,
the Justices used "penumbra" to refer to indeterminacy in the
reach of a statute.16 Of the eleven cases dealing with privacy, in
only six of them did a Justice using the metaphor argue in favor
of finding a violation of the right of privacy, with Justice Douglas
dissenting in three of those cases.166 And in only one majority opi-
nion did a Justice invoke the metaphor-Justice Blackmun in Roe
v. Wade.'16 In the state and lower federal courts, an electronic
search discloses that the metaphor still enjoys wide usage.6 8
163. Search Query for "Penumbra," LEXISNEXIS, www.lexisnexis.com (select "Search"
hyperlink; then select "Legal" hyperlink; then select "Cases-U.S." hyperlink; then select
"U.S. Supreme Court Cases, Lawyers' Edition" hyperlink; then search for "penumbra and
date aft 10/1/1965"; then follow "search" hyperlink).
164. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 594-95 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (major-
ity invalidating statute criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct); Ferguson v. City of Char-
leston, 532 U.S. 67, 92-93 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (majority inva-
lidating drug testing policy); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 208 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (majority upholding the prosecution of a homosexual couple for sodomy), over-
ruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747, 773 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (invalidating
statute regulating abortion), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 870 (1992); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 nn.23 & 25 (1977) (upholding a
statute requiring maintenance of records of persons receiving prescriptions for controlled
substances); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1973) (upholding injunc-
tion against showing obscene films in a movie theater to consenting adults); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973) (invalidating anti-abortion statute); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 471-72 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (majority rejecting statute criminalizing dis-
tribution of contraceptives to unmarried people); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 322,
324 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (majority upholding police seizure of
clothing while searching defendant's home); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341
(1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (majority upholding use of hidden re-
cording device to record incriminating statements); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
778-79 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (majority permitting drawing blood for an alcohol
analysis test without consent of the party arrested for driving while intoxicated).
165. See, e.g., Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 150 (1985) (Brennan,
J., concurring in judgment).
166. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at
773 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted); Roe, 410 U.S. at 129; Hayden, 387 U.S. at
322, 324 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Osborn, 385 U.S. at 341 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (cita-
tion omitted); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 778-79 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
167. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129.
168. Search Query for "Penumbra," LEXISNEXIS, www.lexisnexis.com (select "Search"
hyperlink; then select "Legal" hyperlink; then select "Federal & State cases, combined"
hyperlink; then search for "penumbra and date aft 10/1/1965"; then follow "search" hyper-
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Thus, although the metaphor of the penumbra played a role in
establishing a constitutional right of privacy, it has played a mi-
nimal role in developing the content of that right.
IV. CONCLUsIoN
In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, the case re-
jecting a school policy permitting students to be released from
school in order to receive religious instruction, Justice Stanley
Reed responded to Justice Hugo Black's reliance on the "wall of
separation" metaphor to justify the ruling.69 Justice Reed wrote,
"A rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech." 70
Whatever the merits of Justice Reed's pronouncement, metaphors
shape judicial holdings and give content to statutory and consti-
tutional provisions, even when the metaphors are questionable.
For example, the "wall" metaphor supports a First Amendment
stricture that appeals to only one side on a controversial issue.
Justice Reed dissented, because he disagreed with the side of the
argument that the metaphor endorsed.'' Yet, many cases have
employed the metaphor in making law favorable to that figure of
speech. The "penumbra" metaphor offers an unsatisfying justifi-
cation for the right of privacy. Yet, it continues to appear in the
case law.
An important question is why do these faulty metaphors sur-
vive? To be sure, they enjoy less prominence than they once did;
however, they are still in use. Two reasons suggest themselves:
their visual and physical appeal and their power as precedent.
First, they are visually and physically appealing. The notion of
a wall separating church and state is easy to grasp and lends it-
self to simple decisionmaking. For those accepting the wall meta-
phor, rarely are there close decisions about nativity scenes, mo-
numents to the Ten Commandments, or aid to religiously
affiliated schools. There is no place for interplay between church
and state. Yet the case law speaks otherwise. As Judge Posner
link) (displaying nearly three thousand results).
169. 333 U.S. 203, 211-212 (1948). For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 59-61
and accompanying text.
170. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 247 (Reed, J., dissenting) (noting that the University of
Virginia, which Jefferson helped found, provided for religious education, despite Jeffer-
son's assertion of the "wall" metaphor).
171. Compare id. at 211 (majority opinion), with id. at 247 (Reed, J., dissenting).
2011]1 487
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
has written, "The danger is that a metaphor may elide the rea-
soning process that would reveal the limits of the analogy ...
that the metaphor conveys."17 2
Because astronomical penumbras are relatively rare and can
be awe inspiring, their appeal is hard to gainsay. Even though
the metaphor's use in privacy cases is intellectually confusing,
the nature of a penumbra and the limited use of the word in
common parlance make it alluring and enhance its staying pow-
er.
Second, once an appealing metaphor begins to appear in cases,
the metaphor enjoys the power of precedent. The drafters of fu-
ture judicial opinions are likely to continue to use the reasoning
and metaphors that appeared in prior cases. As a result, the me-
taphors begin to develop a life of their own. In the case of the
"penumbra" metaphor, after its use by Justice Field,' the Justic-
es who revived its usage were Justices Holmes14 and Hand.75
Certainly their prominence helped make the metaphor acceptable
to other opinion writers.
To be clear, legal metaphors can contribute to legal discourse.116
One scholar has identified five functions of legal metaphors: (1)
they serve a decorative function, which adds to the persuasive-
ness of argument; (2) they operate as a form of analogical reason-
ing, which makes abstract concepts more concrete; (3) they com-
pare one concept to another and may encourage the reader to find
similarities in different events and legal theories; (4) by linking
unrelated ideas, they can unleash creative thought; and (5) they
can express concepts in a few words as opposed to a few pages.7
For example, a strict separationist may find the wall metaphor
perfectly satisfactory on all these counts. And, in general, the
"marketplace of ideas" metaphor works reasonably well as a me-
172. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 357 (3d ed. 2009).
173. See supra notes 110, 116 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
176. See David T. Ritchie, Who Is On the Outside Looking In, and What Do They See?:
Metaphors of Exclusion in Legal Education, 58 MERCER L. REV. 991, 993-94 (2007) (stat-
ing that metaphors are "fundamental" in "forming and expressing our intellectual imagi-
nation in the context of legal reasoning and communication").
177. See Chad M. Oldfather, The Hidden Ball: A Substantive Critique of Baseball Me-
taphors in Judicial Opinions, 27 CONN. L. REV. 17, 20-24 (1994).
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taphor advancing an underlying principle of First Amendment ju-
risprudence.17
From these examples come two lessons. First, before using a
metaphor, a court should seriously consider whether it is an apt
metaphor that, within limits, helps describe and create the law.
Second, courts should abandon the use of a poor metaphor before
it takes root. Metaphors do create law, and poor metaphors inhi-
bit law's progress.
178. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. But see Oldfather, supra note 177, at
26-28 (noting that the metaphor fails to acknowledge that the marketplace of ideas some-
times fails to exalt truth).
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